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Issue 8 (2017) - Scrutinizing Surfaces
Microscopy, Surfaces and the Unknowable in Seventeenth-Century
Natural Philosophy (from Lucretius to Margaret Cavendish)
Kevin Killeen
[1]  Catherine WilsonÕs The Invisible World depicts the problematic history of surfaces in
the seventeenth century, how ostensibly smooth, composite, uninterrupted matter turned
out, under the gaze of amplificatory technology, to be a treacherous, gnarly landscape,
pocked and intricate, not only permeable, but in a state of continual streaming with effluvia
and an oozy unsolidity. The microscope offered a long series of encounters, both textual and
visual, with the minimal, as counter-intuitive as quantum physics proved to the twentieth
century. ÔScienceÕ Wilson points out, or at least science in the process of discovering new
things, Ôis improbableÕ (Wilson 1995: 7). Here were surfaces so utterly unlike anything the
unaided senses could discern, that they could not but bewilder, with their demand both that
the augmented senses be trusted as the conduit of knowledge of nature and that we concede
they were deceived in the first place. Microscopy was deployed to support a resurgent
corpuscularity, albeit there was scepticism about what exactly was being seen. As Christoph
Meinel noted, the imaginative work of producing atoms from what could be seen through
the lens was considerable (Meinel 1988: 81-4; also Wilson 2002: 168-9). The coordinates by
which one could map the surface to the inner structure of things became ever more
complex, not least in the response of Margaret Cavendish to early microscopic publications
(Cavendish 1666), which was to elaborate on the relationship between exterior and interior
knowledge, not in regard to what the observer knew, but how surfaces themselves Ð vital
and after a fashion perceptive Ð knew and responded to their surroundings.
[2]  Early modern surfaces, scientifically and atomically speaking, were discovered to be a
hilly, steamy rind of reality, characterized less by a common-sense solidity of objects than
by their poor borders, leaky in all directions. Robert Boyle was far from alone among early
modern scientists in being troubled by sweat, Ôthe great plenty of matter that is daily carried
off by Sweat, and insensible TranspirationÕ, as he put it in his Experiments and
considerations about the porosity of bodies (Boyle 1684: 9). Effluvia and extramissive
qualities by which objects gave off their atomic exfoliations meant that few or no surfaces
could be deemed solid, deep down (so to speak). Solidity was a matter of scale and a failure
of attention to the minute. Porosity and permeability, the openness of bodies to the
external, came to seem a fact about matter which was startlingly new. Innovative and
strange as they might be, and dependent upon a microscopy whose epistemological
corruption was still up for debate, the sciences of augmented reality were for Boyle a
quintessentially Baconian mode of unknotting natureÕs intricate structures:
I scarce doubt, but if such little things had not escaped the sight of our
Illustrious Verulam, he would have afforded a good Porology (if I may so call it)
a place, (and perhaps not the lowest neither,) among his Desiderata (Boyle
1684: 2).
BoyleÕs Bacon would have produced a science of neglected surface, a ÔPorologyÕ to map the
topographical terrain of the only apparently smooth. BaconÕs expansive wish-list of things
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missing from the purview of human knowledge, his Desiderata, was a repeated reference
point in the early modern rejuvenation of science, placing special heuristic value on the
anomalous in nature (the Ôprerogative instancesÕ in Novum Organum) and for Boyle, the
microscope revealed a majestic strangeness and profusion of new discoveries in need of
explanation (Keller 2015: 167-98; Hunter 2015: 26-32). Microscopy would discern the
secret conduits and Ôperforations that pass quite through the leatherÕ of the skin, the
disturbing correlates of which include BoyleÕs presumably offhand comment: Ôwhen a mans
skin is tanned it is of a greater thickness then one would expectÕ (Boyle 1684: 11). The
permeability of things, their lack of borders, was not only a matter of anatomical curiosity,
however. It produced, in early modern writers a sense of a new, near-sublime texture to
things.
[3]  Whether fluid or firm, the stuff of nature might intuitively be deemed continuous.
Surfaces kept the in in and the out out. There could of course be objects whose
characteristics included the perforated and porous, but matter could nevertheless be
thought of for practical (and even scientific) purposes as uninterrupted. An Aristotelian
legacy firmly opposed to atomic speculation, and presuming the continuous nature of
matter, albeit under qualified circumstances, was part of the furniture of philosophical
learning (Meinel 1988: 70-1). Beneath the threshold of the senses, as Boyle phrases an
interim ÔobjectionÕ to his speculations, Ôthe body must appear an uninterrupted or continuÕd
oneÕ. However, Boyle was not prepared to concede much ground to this merely common-
sense idea, when he addressed the subject in his History of Fluidity and Firmness,
published in Certain physiological essays (Boyle 1669: 189-90). His corpuscularity,
chemical as much as mechanical, had little time for an illusory continuity (Clericuzio 2001:
103-48; Principe 2000: 63-90; Wojcik 1997: 151-188, Anstey 2011). BoyleÕs sense of
omnidirectional porosity depicts the surfaces of things as never more than contingent and
temporary:
A Body then seems to be Fluid, chiefly upon this account, That it consists of
Corpuscles that touching one another in some parts only of their Surfaces (and
so being incontiguous in the rest) and separately Agitated to and fro, can by
reason of the numerous pores or spaces necessarily left betwixt their
incontiguous parts, easily glide along each others superficies (Boyle 1669: 164).
Fluids are in this sense, illustrative of the motile reality in which, atomically speaking,
constant motion is the very nature of things. Spherical corpuscles Ôconduce to their easie
rouling upon one anotherÕ, a continual turning upside-down and a churning of apparent
surface. Discussing how Salt-Petre in gunfire Ôemulates a fluid bodyÕ, he wonders whether
this fusion involves Ôthe Ingress and transcursions of the atoms of fire themselvesÕ into the
nitre, and concludes that the Ôpervasion of a foreign bodyÕ is the most plausible explanation,
not in the relatively gross manner of liquid diffusing into liquid, but a Ômore thin and subtilÕ
invasion and interpenetration (Boyle 1669: 184-9). Natural philosophy sought, in such a
formulation, an account of the forces that governed the Ôunloosable mobility of AtomsÕ and
the inter-atomic Ôcement to unite themÕ, why things remained together (Boyle 1669: 165,
189, 210). To assert the boundedness of things, the simple integrity of objects, was not
enough.
[4]  The emergence of scientific modernity is often still viewed as a sad but necessary
putting aside of the poetic, a coming into rationality that is almost a narrative of the Fall.
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Whether via the disenchantment of the world, as Max Weber and others have posited, or via
the Foucaudian epistemic shift away from analogical Ôworld viewÕ, a loss of the metaphoric
capacity of reality was part and parcel of this epochal shift (Weber 1917: 9, Foucault 1970).
Joseph Amato, in his 2013 Surfaces: A History describes just such a denuding of the poetics
of the world that pits De Vinci against Descartes. The medieval was engrossed in its
Ôimmanence and transcendence of every surfaceÕ, embodied in the cathedralÕs lithic,
luminous being, whose hulking blocks of stone could nevertheless orchestrate light and
colour, an experience of immense if not impossible geometry inside the stony lung of the
outsized church. He tells the tale of this soaring, spatial encounter with the ineffable, which
in the seventeenth century came up against an Ôantithetical way of reading surfacesÕ, the
Cartesian calculus, which could map the curve in astringent mathematics and a precision
rationality which Ôwashed the surfaces of the visible world clean of their sensuality and
texturesÕ, along with the cosmological flight and ontological acrobatics of the medieval
(Amato 2013: 119, 127). If ever there was a Fall, this was it, science and philosophy hand in
hand with wandering steps and slow: Ôgone too were the whorls and shells of analogies,
metaphors and symbols that had enwrapped entire peoplesÕ (Amato 2013: 135).
[5]  Microscopy has similarly been crafted into a narrative of pigeon-stepped empirical
progress, hubristic and cack-handed occasionally, but in essence marching to the drum of
rationalism and technological progress, ousting the idea of occult qualities and inching, by
degrees, towards a more coherent understanding of forces (Hutchison 1982; Henry 1986).
There is no doubt some accuracy in this, and yet it remains the case that the intellectual
terra incognita of the surface, newly available to the minuscule gaze of the seventeenth
century, provided an epistemological jolt, a new and counterintuitive texture of reality that
mesmerized natural philosophers. Surfaces, those least metaphorical, most literal of things
Ð the opposite of deep Ð became objects of untrustable paradox. This was experienced in
writer after writer as an almost mystical buckling of reality; the definitively dull and
paradigmatically ordinary-superficial had become mysterious. Scholarship on the Fall as a
pervasive supposition in early modern thought has accustomed us to the eraÕs encounters
with things beyond the ken of mere humans, cosmologies too immense, or creation too
intricate to fathom (Harrison 2009). But microscopy presented something new, and this
essay traces the amazement of early modern natural philosophy in the face of the newly
unknowable, when the apparently smooth and continuous surface of the real proved
calloused, inscrutable and inconstant. The argument of this essay is neither one of the
triumph of rationalism over poetics, nor the reverse; but rather it traces their enfoldedness.
It deals firstly with early microscopy, arguing that its florid rhetoric was less an ornamental
addition to empirical description than a tactical poetics; a rhetorical mode that inoculated
their descriptions of micro-reality from the harsh strictures of plain description that
Restoration science prided itself on. The body of the essay, after that, deals with scientific
uses of Lucretius in early modernity, how writers found in him a model and a language for
addressing the apparent irreality of scale and texture they encountered in microscopy. The
essay concludes with one of the most vehement, strange and brilliant responses to
microscopy, the still under-read natural philosophy of Margaret Cavendish, whose attention
to surface, to the discontinuities of inner and outer, exemplifies the scope of the
philosophical puzzle that the seventeenth century found itself faced with.
[6]  Early modern natural philosophers describe, with some excitement and some vertigo,
the disorientating experience of the small, and the shifting scales of reference by which the
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straight line came to seem pocked, the smooth surface became jagged and the barely
perceptible fleck of an insect proved intricate beyond any imagination. The complex
response to such discovery involved, in the first instance, and in the first publications, a
recourse to the poetic. Merely to communicate the strange sights, the dazzling order and
bewildering disorder, the earliest accounts of microscopic vision sound at times like travel
marvels, and elsewhere as though they need to coin a labyrinthine vocabulary to convey the
remarkable world of the tiny: a nettle appeared to Henry Power like a ÔSword-CutlerÕs Shop,
full of glittering drawn Swords, Tucks, and DaggersÕ. Describing a Ôline drawn upon paperÕ,
he notes how it Ôappears all ragged, indented, and discontinued by the rugosities and
seeming protuberances of the paperÕ (Power 1664: 51, 53). Writing about Ôthe Edge of a
RazorÕ, Robert Hooke notes that this most exact of objects, with its Ôaffinity to the sharpest
Point in Physics, as a line hath to a point in MathematicksÕ seems so only Ôtill more closely
viewed by the Microscope, and there we may observe its very Edge to be of all kind of shape,
except what it should beÕ, a jagged Ôroughness of those surfacesÕ, such that one: Ômay find
reason to think there is scarce a surface in rerum natur perfectly smoothÕ (Hooke 1665: 4-
5). MicroscopyÕs discovery in the period was the outlandish irregularity of things, the
illusion of plain surface, and its findings took Restoration London by storm (Hunter 2013;
Hunter, 2010; Jardine, 1999).
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Figure one: Robert Hooke, Micrographia, ÔOf blue mould, and of the first principles of vegetation
arising from putrefaction, Of a plant growing in the blighted or yellow specks of Damask-rose leavesÕ.
[7] Power, a writer who secluded in Halifax remained peripheral to the tumult of Royal
Society and Hartlibian science, was one of the earliest enthusiasts for microscopic
exactitude (Hughes 2010). Where Hooke, publishing a year later, commissioned and made
his intricate, beautiful, monstrous and outsized pictures of fleas, gnats, or the eye of a grey-
drone fly, all swollen to the size of a football, PowerÕs Experimental philosophy depends
upon intricately wrought prose for its effect, depicting the world from its immensity to its
most minute in a state of constant motion, such that there is no Ôabsolute quiescenceÕ,
neither in the pulsating heavens nor in the infinitesimally small. He argued, citing Bacon,
that natural philosophy had for too long been held hostage to mere sight, in all its
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limitations, while its task ought more properly be to discern the intricate surface of matter,
by augmenting lenses as well as deductive inference: Ôwhatsoever is invisible, either in
respect of the fineness of the Body it self, or the smalness of the parts, or of the subtlety of
its motion, is little enquiredÕ (Power 1664: sig. c2r). PowerÕs Faustian ambition was to
discern the previously indescribable streaming of bodies, both celestial and effluvial:
and as for the Opace [opaque] and Planetary Bodies of the Universe, they are all
porous, and the aetherial Matter is continually streaming through them, their
internal fire and heat constantly subliming Atoms out of them, the Magnetical
Atoms continually playing about them É the supreme Being (who is Activity it
self) never made any thing inactive or utterly devoid of MotionÉ (Power 1664:
sig. B4v-C1r)
Not only did matter subsist in motion and mutability, a ceaseless subliming of itself, but
God himself consisted in theological seething and insurgence, the raw principle of activity.
[8]  Magnification, Power argued, did not distort as much as ordinary sight, which was
doomed to the intractably flat, a surface no closer to reality than a painted, perspectival
stage-set. The quotidian gaze was an epistemological trick and any honest natural
philosophy demanded that it be rectified by a technology to circumvent our planate human
habits of perception: Ôwithout some such Mechanical assistance, our best Philosophers will
but prove empty Conjecturalists, and their profoundest Speculations herein, but glossÕd
outside Fallacies; like our Stage-scenes, or Perspectives, that shew things inwards, when
they are but superficial paintingsÕ (Power 1664: sig. c3v). Power noted the decay of sensory
powers as a facet of the long, slow Fall of the senses, asking whether the ÔAged world stands
now in need of SpectaclesÕ and whether our ÔPrimitive father Adam might be more quick &
perspicacious in Apprehension,Õ a passage we might suppose to be itself quite porous and
absorbent of Joseph GlanvillÕs wonderful claim that ÔAdam needed no Spectacles. The
acuteness of his natural Opticks (if conjecture may have credit) shewÕd him much of the
Coelestial magnificence and bravery without a GalilaeoÕs tubeÕ (Power 1664: sig. a4r;
Glanvill 1661: 5).
[9]  PowerÕs optimism in this Ômechanical assistanceÕ was thorough-going and
uncompromising in its call for whatever might bring us closer to the reality of the miniature,
to atoms in their oscillation and the secret motions of microscopic being. Indeed, he
suggested that the sight of and insight into effluvia itself was not far off:
we might hope, ere long, to see the Magnetical Effluviums of the Loadstone, the
Solary Atoms of light (or globuli aetherei of the renowned Des-Cartes) the
springy particles of Air, the constant and tumultuary motion of the Atoms of all
fluid Bodies, and those infinite, insensible Corpuscles (Power 1664: sig. c2v-c3r).
Later in the body of the text he seems to backtrack on any imminent prospect of
understanding how effluxions function, suggesting, in a phrase from Thomas Browne that it
is ÔA part of Philosophy but yet in discovery; and will, I fear, prove the last Leaf to be turned
over in the Book of NatureÕ (Power 1664: 58; Browne 2014: 168). This uncertainty of scale Ð
how much further humans would need to go to sound the bottom of physical reality, and
what additional unsettling paradoxes one might meet in probing down Ð was not just a
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question of technological boundaries. It presented also a serious epistemological problem. If
atoms remained beyond the visible, what kind of demonstration was philosophically
sufficient to make assertions about their nature? Seventeenth-century theorization of
atoms, from Gassendi through Sennent, to Power and Charleton was deeply invested in
analogical models from the visible world, motes in the sun or clouds on mountain-tops
whose solidity proved illusory (Boyle 1669: 191; Browne 2014: 194). In the absence of any
empirical demonstration of atoms (see Wilson, 2008; Meinel 1988), natural philosophers
had to make do with extrapolation and metaphor and early modern science was adept,
indeed formidable in this respect. ÔI have more than once taken pleasure to look upon an
heap of swarming BeesÕ wrote Boyle, Ôfor though they make not up a liquid but coherent
body, which may be turnÕd upside down without losing its coherence É yet these motions of
the particular Bees destroy not the coherency of the heapÕ (Boyle 1669: 203).
[10]   Microscopy Ôtakes away the privilege of a surfaceÕ writes Catherine Wilson. The closer
one looked, the more it became evident, that the merely similar, and microcosmic
correspondences based on them, was a flawed way of looking. Surfaces were open to their
own interiors in the sheer knotty complexity of fibres and pores and Ôin the interior of things
there is no resemblanceÕ, Wilson continues (Wilson 1995: 62). The surface that looped in on
itself, that dipped into its own involuted interior revealed just enough of itself, to
demonstrate its unfathomable nature, ÔImplexions and Entanglements É Omnifarious
Particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of MotionsÕ, as Ralph Cudworth wrote, not
kindly, of neo-Lucretian atomic speculation (Cudworth 1678: 98). ÔThe division between
inner and outer is just a tacticÕ writes Steven Connor, in his excellent history of skin. Its
exchanges are chronic and intrinsic and as unmappable as smoke: ÔA column of smoke
possesses no simple inside or outside, but the supposition of interiority and exteriority,
repeatedly insurgent and abandonedÕ (Connor 2004: 39). To speak of a ÔtacticÕ of reality
might seem, initially at least, at odds with the Restoration desire for plain language in its
science. But much early modern natural philosophy would be wholly at home with ConnorÕs
formulation of a turbulent inner and outer. Early modern writers were positively effusive
and irredeemably poetic about the epistemological involutions, the baffling irreality that
microscopy suggested. The surface of things was pocked; there were scaly rinds where we
presumed things smooth; there were shadow valleys dipping ever-inward on the exterior of
things, labyrinths folding in on themselves. To explain such epistemological chaos, writers
turned frequently to the poetic, which provided some surprising ready-made resources.
[11]  Natural philosophy in the second half of the seventeenth century saw a surge of interest
in Lucretius, the Roman epic ÔparaphrastÕ of Epicurus (Charleton 1654: 100, also Boyle
1669: 165). He is quoted in early modern philosophical writing out of all proportion to his
ÔscientificÕ worth. His atoms were slightly preposterous by most seventeenth century
corpuscularian standards (Lthy 2001; Pyle 1995; Kargon, 1966). His fantasies of omni-
explanatory philosophical breadth Ð that what explains the first grass, also explains the
weather and sex and feeling plaguey Ð were wholly beyond the philosophical pale. They
were the opposite of Baconian sobriety, or Cartesian precision, or even the theo-physics of
those who would attempt a biblical mechanics of creation. He denied and indeed mocked
divine providence, the immortality of the soul, and was frequently seen as straightforwardly
atheist, albeit occasionally Christianized (Charleton 1664; Fotherby 1622: 122-3). He was
derided for the tale, apparently originating in Jerome, that he had fallen victim to a love
philter, given to him by his wife, which drove him to suicide (Heywood 1626: 217;
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Montaigne 1613: 191; Anon 1665: 451). Any one of these things might have precluded his
being taken seriously, and yet early modernity could not stop thinking about Lucretius
(Palmer 2014; Gillespie 2007, Brown, 2010). Some worried that he was too good, with the
seductive elegance of his poetry, Ôby the extraordinary Goodness of the Verse, the Badness of
this EpicureanÕs Notions is (I fear) unhappily instilled into the Minds of young GentlemenÕ
(Edwards 1696: 119; also Wright 1694: 4-5).
Figure two: Lucretius, De rerum natura, Vat. lat. 1569 fol. 1 recto medbio04 NAN.13
[12]  Lucretius mattered to the eraÕs natural philosophy, I would suggest, not because he
provided any particularly convincing demonstrations of atomism that would meet the
exacting if speculative standards of early modern scientists, but for reasons more tangential:
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first, because of his poetics of scale, and second, because he spoke so impressively about
texture. The disorientation of microscopic scale by which continuity of surface proved only
illusory has its direct correlate in De Rerum Natura, which produces similar perspectival
shifts that defy or mock the senses. Explaining how Ôalthough all atoms are in motion, their
totality appears to stand totally motionlessÕ, Lucretius describes their elusive motion below
the range of the senses by reference to two scenes, one of pastoral stillness and serenity and
the other, a ferocious melee, both of which, from a lofty enough stance, seem to be nothing
of the sort: ÔOften, on a hillside fleecy sheep, as they crop their lush pasture, creep slowly
onward, lured this way or that by grass that sparkles with fresh dew, while the full-fed
lambs gaily frisk and buttÕ, but from a distance, this is only as motionless a hill as any other
(Lucretius, 2.309-10); or in a battle: ÔMighty legions, waging mimic war, are thronging the
plain with their manoeuvresÕ. But from a height, the wheeling of horses and flashing of
armour means nothing, Ôa blaze of light stationary upon the plainÕ (Lucretius, 2.317-20).[1]
An apparent stillness of surface tells us only so much about its real vibrant life. Just as the
tumult of atomic activity passes below the range of any human scrutiny, so too scale renders
emotion insignificant Ð the slow lovely pastoral, or the intense tumult of battle Ð are, from
some lofty perspective, negligible, indistinguishable. From the distance of the gods, who will
not be gazing down, from the perspective of the indifferent universe, nothing significant has
changed; the surface is placid, the world unruffled. De Rerum Natura makes divine
indifference key to haughtily neutral matter; atoms have no design on or care for human
welfare.
[13]  But the readerÕs disorientation, in quick-fire flight between scenes, does matter.
Lucretius produces endlessly reframed analogies for how atoms move or are combined and
the reader has to adjust the scale of reference with some agility; they are, by turns, like
motes in the sun in their chaotic streams; like the flotsam of a wrecked flotilla of ships,
Ôthwarts and ribs, yard-arms and prowÕ; like racehorses let loose with coiled energy; like the
delirious un-replicable mass of individual faces (Lucretius, Book 2. 115, 553, 264, 346). Any
one of these is just model and metaphor, but in their consistent rapid reconfiguring of
images, they produce their perplexing, but far from innocent, effects. It is not just that
atoms are ÔlikeÕ these things, but that they in fact become them; the tiny anarchic atom
produces the anarchy of the sea. John Evelyn, who translated the first book of De Rerum
Natura wrote in his animadversions on the manner in which the apparently invisible,
unobservable atoms, could manifest themselves though their cumulative effects:
Éwhich though they consist indeed of Atomes altogether inconspicuous to our
weak organs, yet do their monstrous effects (which he there compares to that of
precipitating Rivers and Cataracts, which have violated their banks, and spoilÕd
the adjacent places) prove them to be bodies (Evelyn 1656: 127).
The Lucretian poetic embodies the stochastic, the scattered event, the infraction of the
normal course of things, the clinamen whose almost undetectable deviation from its flow
produces its cataclysm of variety (Passannate 2011: 76-82; Shearin, 2015). And this ability
to replicate life at large on the scale of the infinitesimal proved an attractive quality both in
the poetic and the proto-scientific deployment of Lucretius.
[14]  Thomas Creech, in the notes following his translation of Lucretius, attacks his author
on many fronts, including his atheism and Ôendeavour to disgrace ReligionÕ, but is also
concerned throughout with his scientific (im)plausibility, in the course of which Creech
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makes reference to the Ômany experiments of the Honorable BoylÕ, and other early modern
natural philosophers, on for instance the nature of air, fluidity and continuum, and on the
Epicurean ascription of weight to atoms, with the corresponding implications for their
motion, ÔresilitionÕ (rebound) and declination (Creech in Lucretius, 1682: sep. pag. 39, 22,
17-18). Boyle, in the preface or ÔAdvertisementÕ to the History of Fluidity and Firmness,
explained that he was only eclectically Epicurean: ÔThe Authors Explicating things chiefly
according to the Atomical Principles will not be thought strange, nor be lookt upon as a sure
Argument of his being wedded to the particular opinions wherein the Atomists differ from
other modern NaturalistsÕ. Indeed he notes the merely strategic explanatory value of
Lucretius, and that he is quite content to dispute or augment, when necessary:
especially since he [Boyle] has on some occasions plainly enough intimated the
contrary, by proposing, together with the Atomical ways of resolving a thing,
another Explication more agreeable to the Cartesian, or some other modern
Hypothesis (Boyle 1669: 161-2).
This claim to strategic use of De Rerum Natura should, I think, be taken at face value,
rather than supposing a nervousness about appearing too Lucretian Ð Lucretius answered a
very particular set of seventeenth century needs in natural philosophy, one of which was the
Latin poetÕs conception of scale. Another not unrelated use of Lucretius was his phenomenal
imagining of texture and touch, the knottedness and entanglement of matter up close, the
atomic variety of texture explaining the diversity of things. This had its correlate in the early
modern experience with the intricate (if synaesthetic) tactility of the microscope, revealing
the knobbed, rugged and fibrous surface of things.
[15]  Boyle deploys Lucretius in both parts of his History of Fluidity and Firmness, first to
illustrate the Ôgliding of the CorpusclesÕ and the Ôeasy roulingÕ of their spherical form, and
then to demonstrate their knitty and gnarly complexity. Atoms are, he asserts, constructed
in intricate protrusions, Ôsome like buttons, others like loops, some like male, others like
female screwsÕ (Boyle 1669: 165, 235). They snag with hooks or Ôslender twigsÕ. Quoting
from the Lucretian account of touch Ð Ôtactus enim, tactus, pro divum numina sanctaÕ; ÔThis
touch, this touch! O sacred deitiesÕ, as rendered by Lucy Hutchinson, (Lucretius: 2. 434) Ð
Boyle extols how their design, albeit for Lucretius chance design, produces superlative
strength from minimal components. He gives among his examples Ôof the power of the bare
Texture of many small BodiesÕ how slender threads produce ÔRopes and Cables; where only
by twisting together and wreathing the slender and flexible threds the Cable is made up of,
they are so well as it were wedgÕd in between and fastenÕd to one anotherÕ. They can hold
fast a ship violently driven by storms, in their intricate corpuscular strength, of which he
notes: ÔThis figuration of the Corpuscles that make up consistent Bodies, seems to have been
the chief if not only cause of their consistence in the Judgment of the antient Atomists, this
being the account that is given of it by LucretiusÕ (Boyle 1669: 235, quoting Lucretius,
2.444-9).
[16]   Atoms, continually re-forming in their ars combinatoria out of which everything
constructed itself, produce what Michel Serres in The Birth of Physics, calls the Ôvoluptuous
knowledgeÕ of De Rerum Natura, its coordinating of multi-faceted godless life, scientific,
mythic, emotional and all-encompassing, the Ôphysics of AphroditeÕ, voluptuous of theme,
and sensual in its epistemology, a world abrasive, alive, emerging Ôlike Aphrodite from a flux
of elements É complex, twined, twisting its long thick hairÕ (Serres 2000: 107, 104-5).
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Touch not vision, is the coordinating sense and even vision, in the workÕs extramissive sight
theory, in which frail simulacra produce a universe of phantoms in continual exfoliation
from every surface, is tactile. Walter Charleton citing Lucretius, concludes that Ôall
Sensation is a kind of TouchingÕ, (Charleton 1654: 248). The crush that natural philosophers
had on Lucretius in the second half of the seventeenth century derived, at least in part, from
the seductive, dangerous nature of this tactility, that Ômost exquisite and delicate sense of
TouchingÕ as Charleton comments, before shifting from natural philosophy to temptation
Ôthe titillation whereof transports a man beyond the severity of his reason, and charmes him
to the act of CarnalityÕ (Charleton 1654: 249; Booth, 2006).
[17]  De Rerum Natura provided a poetics of texture for describing the physical world,
which anticipated the counter-intuitive ruggedness of things at a material level. This
preceded, but was augmented by the discovery of microscopic roughness, and the new-
found technical ability to penetrate surface-illusion of uninterrupted, erugatory form.
Atoms were unresting. Walter Charleton, narrating the history of Epicurean-Lucretian
atoms, recounts their perpetual warring motion, his sheer adjectival bombardment in
imitative atomic action:
on all sides crowding, impelling, and justling each other É a long, long afflux,
reflux, conflux, elevation, depression, coagmentation and other various and
successive agitations and molitions of these Atoms (Charleton 1652: 41-2).
The boundedness of objects made of vigorous atoms was, for early modern scientists, a
thing of wonder, that elements so motile could nevertheless through sheer texture prove so
solid. Atoms existed in a ceaseless and delirious movement, the Ôcircumvolution, gyration,
or vertiginous eddy of them É [an] immense vortex, wedged in each other into the form of
an integument or cortexÕ, and yet, at the level of everyday things, they constituted all that
was solid, their thick texture producing an illusion of surface that was whole and calm
(Charleton 1652: 46).
[18]  Lucretius provided a model of perception as perpetual wrong-footedness, and
disorientation of scale, in a work that is by turns intricate, then vast, an immensity of the
tiny that replicated the conceptual vertigo of the microscopic. Those who speculated on the
new experience of the miniature in the seventeenth century were all too well aware of
perceptual distortion, and of the speculative nature of any atomism. The gambit of truth by
which atoms might just approximate to reality was very much Lucretian, a poetics of natural
philosophy that was uniquely able to enfold plain and complex ÔinvolutionÕ of truth:
ÔParabolical and Poetical Fictions conduce am ad lumen & illustrationem, qum ad
involucrum & velum, as well to the illustration of darker, as the involution of more evident
peices [sic] of TruthÕ (Charleton 1652: 198-9). Elegance of poetry did not of course imply a
thing to be true, but the widespread incorporation of Lucretius into natural philosophy
spoke to a pressing need for a mode of seeing the unseeable (e.g. Casaubon 1646: 9-10;
More 1668: 182, 185; Culverwel 1652: 196). If the infinitesimal was to remain beyond
human perception, truth might have to be glimpsed rather than laid out in full splendor.
[19]   Microscopy provoked a number of antagonistic responses, some philosophical, some
medical and some just itchy. A 1668 text on the profoundly uncomfortable experience of
small life spoke of Ôseveral species of wormes macerating and direfully cruciating every part
of the bodies of mankindÕ (Ramesey 1668). Gideon Harvey wrote against the College of
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Physicians in an aspersive account of Ôtheir intrigues, frauds, plots against their patientsÕ,
ridiculing their microscopic practices and the self-publicising chicanery, in which they
collected Ôwhatever false appearances are glanced into their eyes, these to obtrude to the
World in Print, to no other end, than to beget a belief in people, that they who have so
profoundly dived into the bottomless pores of the parts, must undeniably be skilled in
curing their distempersÕ (Harvey 1686: 25). If Boyle could extol the idea of a Porology, for
Harvey plumbing the bottomless pores was mere chicanery, and mountebank rhetoric.
[20]   But there were also more substantial philosophical arguments against microscopy,
among which those of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, are most intriguing.
Having repudiated her early interest in atomism, by the mid-1660s, she was challenging
both the theories of perception that were the premise of microscopy and the framework of
matter theory, into which any understanding of surface and under-surface should be
figured. Her extensive philosophical writings of this period return frequently to the
discontinuity between Ôinterior and exteriorÕ, and the nature of self-knowledgeable matter,
surface that was aware of its own superficiality. CavendishÕs Observations upon
Experimental Philosophy (1666) has some scathing comments on the epistemological value
of microscopy and the over-enthusiasm of Hooke and Power for the nascent technology in
their recently published works, arguing that the science Ôis not able to discover the interior
natural motions of any part or creature of nature; nay the question is, whether it can
represent yet the exterior shapes and motions, so exactly, as naturally they areÕ (Cavendish
1666: 7). In the early part of the work, CavendishÕs concerns centre on perception, how the
artifice (art) of microscopy deforms and mis-shapes the very objects it purports to ÔseeÕ,
failing to acknowledge or understand where sight gave way to conjecture, Ôinterposing and
intermixing parts, forms and positions, as the truth of an object will hardly be knownÕ. Such
technology skewed what one saw, producing ÔhermaphroditicalÕ knowledge, Ômixt figures,
partly artificial, partly naturalÕ and Cavendish was perplexed that it had Ôintoxicated so
many menÕs brainsÕ into attending only to the nature of surface and exterior, such that they
valorized Ôsuperficial wonders, as I may call themÕ. Indeed in calling for a more utile science,
she urged, with fine-tuned condescension, that natural philosophers should properly adopt
the mantle of Bacon, and not act Ôas boys that play with watery bubbles or fling dust into
each otherÕs eyes, or make a hobby horse of snowÕ (Cavendish 1666: 10-11; see Clucas 2003,
1994; Broad 2002; Sarasohn 2010: 149-172).
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Figure three: Margaret Cavendish, Frontispiece from Grounds of natural philosophy
(1668)
[21]  However, CavendishÕs opposition to microscopy was more thoroughgoing (and more
interesting) than merely exposing its ineptitude in what it claimed and aimed to do. When
she writes of exterior knowledge and interior knowledge, she does not mean what we can
know from the outside and what we might like to know about the inside. Rather, she means
what the exterior of an object knows and the different knowledge of the interior.
CavendishÕs world is vitalist; its matter is alive, aware and perceptive, even while that world
is quite some distance, tonally and philosophically, from any kind of mysticism we might
associate with vitalist thought. It is not infused with the divine, and if formally it constitutes
panpsychism, it nevertheless has little sense of an anima mundi or a world electric with
god. This makes for a curious reading experience that is the converse of the microscopists.
Where Power, Hooke and Charleton produce baroque and elegiac prose, awe-struck
empiricism at the intricacy of the universe, whose wonder borders on psalm-like prayer,
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Cavendish might be said to be at the nit-picking and pedantic end of the spectrum of
philosophical rhetoric. At times, she repeats her ideas into the ground, and yet in
themselves, they are exquisitely strange and original. ÔI am of opinionÕ she says, Ôthat nature
is a self-moving, and consequently a self-living and self-knowing infinite bodyÕ, the correlate
of which was a world never at rest: ÔI do not mean exteriorly moving É but interiorly, so that
all the motions that are in nature, are within herselfÕ (Cavendish 1666: 135).[2]
[22]  CavendishÕs matter is triune; it is on the one hand inanimate, but it is, without
exception, imbued and suffused with animate qualities of both the sensitive, in that it
perceives, and the rational, in that it ÔknowsÕ how to respond to contiguous matter. This
tripartite ÔcommixtureÕ of qualities is the constituent and universally-present nature of
matter. As Karen Detlefson writes: Ôno portion of material nature, regardless of how small it
is, lacks any of the three aspects, and so every portion of material nature is self-moving,
sensitive, and rational as well as limited in its abilitiesÕ, its inanimate portion acting as a
fetter on its ability to self-move (Detlefson 2007: 163-4).[3] Matter senses other matter and
knows how to react. The proximity of other bodies prompts things to respond accordingly,
not in any purely mechanistic interaction, but with a degree of free will on the part of the
matter. It is less that cause produces effect than that one object is the ÔoccasionÕ of an
interaction to which the matter responds, knowingly (James, 1999: 222-5; OÕNeill, in
Cavendish 2001: xxix-xxxiii; Detlefsen 2006). Cavendish explicitly and frequently refuses to
distinguish between kinds of matter, whether mineral or animal, and indeed between
matter in general and matter already preformed into discrete figures, whether pebbles,
flowers or humans: Ôsuch composed figures, as, for distinctions sake, we call finite wholes;
as for example, an Animal, a Tree, a StoneÕ. What is important and what unites these is how
matter knows, a thingÕs dynamic knowledge of its own being.
[23]  In explicating and differentiating between Ôexterior knowledgeÕ and Ôinterior
knowledgeÕ, Cavendish is less interested in an observerÕs putative knowledge of the outside
of a thing (produced by Ôpatterning outÕ an always imperfect copy), than in how matter
ÔknowsÕ how to respond to the world (see Clucas 2014). Remarkably, a thing knows in
different ways on its surface and in its interior. Outside and inside respond to different
impulses, and kinds of potential motion simultaneously. There is the Ôfigurative motionÕ, by
which the objectÕs Ôoutward figure or shapeÕ reacts, but there is also action athwart this, a
Ôretentive motionÕ, by which an object produces its own longevity, the Ôpreservation and
continuanceÕ of itself: ÔBy which we may plainly see that one figure lies within another, one
corporeal figurative motion is within another, and that the interior and exterior parts or
figures of Creatures, are different in their actionsÕ (Cavendish 1666: 197-8). Matter dances
to several tunes at one and the same time, and the example she gives returns us to BoyleÕs
interest in the complex fluidity:
the ebbing and flowing, or the ascending and descending motions of water, are
quite different from those interior figurative motions that make it water
(Cavendish 1666: 198, c.f. Stroll, 1988: 10).
The complex plunge of water as it falls, whose state is intricately distinct from moment to
moment produces its shapely reaction to any contiguous surface, be it air or solid, that it
ÔsensesÕ. Its gush ÔknowsÕ and responds to the ÔoccasionÕ of any surrounding and proximate
object. In one sense, this is like Lucretian smoke, its continual reformulation of itself, its
involutions resembling ConnorÕs contingent tactics of inner and outer. But CavendishÕs
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matter is purposeful. It wills how to act in so far as it knows how to act, both at its external
edges and in its interior being, its Ôretentive motionsÕ, by which it moves and remains the
same, Ôthose interior figurative motions that make it waterÕ. Matter knows to act both when
it is considered in undifferentiated clump-form, and when it is composed into discrete
figures.
[24]  Cavendish remains adamant that merely mechanical action, of cause and effect, is an
insufficient explanatory model. When a hand encounters a ball, there are, she insists, two
acts of self-motion, the ball not less decisively part of the action than the hand:
Therefore when a man moves a string, or tosses a Ball; the string or ball is no
more sensible of the motion of the hand, then the hand is of the motion of the
string or ball, but the hand is onely an occasion that the string or ball moves thus
or thus (Cavendish 1666: 159-60).
Kourken Michaelian notes of this passage, the extent to which Cavendish embraces the
seemingly outrageous implications of this: Ôshe holds that the hand is not necessary for the
motion of the ball on the specific ground that the ball moves itself, so that it could have
moved as it does even had the hand not been present Ð the actual cause of a thingÕs motion
is always the thing itselfÕ (Michaelian 2009: 45-6; Detlefsen 166). Not only is the ball
perceptually aware of the hand, but its movement in a particular trajectory is a matter of its
own knowledge (of how it should move) and decision (that it will move):
I will not say, but that it may have some perception of the hand, according to the
nature of its own figure; but it does not move by the handÕs motion, but by its
own: for, there can be no motion imparted, without matter or substance
(Cavendish 1666: 159-60).[4]
For Cavendish, matter is wholly aware of what is contiguous. It knows not only itself (in
interior fashion) but also what it comes into contact with, such that its surface perceives
other surfaces: Ôthe infinite parts of Nature have not onely interior self-knowledg, but also
exterior perceptions of other figures or parts, and their actions; by reason there is a
perpetual commerce and entercourse between parts and partsÕ (Cavendish 1666: 160-1).
While the perceiver may know an object, the object, it seems, knows back.
[25]  At the same time, however, natureÕs perceptive qualities are curtailed in composite
figures by the inability of one part to know another, an Ôignorance of forreign parts, figures
or actions, although they be parts of one composed figureÕ (Cavendish 1666: 198). This idea
is threaded through the Observations, as the faultline in perception, that sight does not
understand touch (ÔIt is known that man has five senses and every sense is ignorant of the
otherÕ) and even that one touch cannot quite make sense of another (Ôone of his hands
knows not the sense and perception of his other hand; nay, one part of his hand knows not
the perception of another part of the same handÕ). This radical discontinuity of the
ÔsensitiveÕ parts is mitigated by the rational, which can coordinate and rectify its
insufficiencies (ÔWhatsoever the sensitive perception is either defective in, or ignorant of,
the rational perception suppliesÕ) but Cavendish creates in her human condition of
nescience and partiality a state in which the perceiving surface is, after a fashion, more
cognizant than the perceiver (Cavendish 1666: 1, 3, 164).
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[26]  What do CavendishÕs ideas of animate matter have to do with microscopy, beyond the
fact that its inadequacy apparently prompted her formulation of ideas about substance
whose interior and exterior might have different notions of what they want to do? The
answer, this essay suggests, lies in the nature of surface, a category newly troubled and
troubling in seventeenth century thought. Natural philosophy of the post-restoration era
returned repeatedly to the idea that surfaces are not staid. Continually and in a streaming
litany of matter, bodies exude, and the occluded stuff of nature is emitted and absorbed. The
omnidirectional pulse of matter that is present in Boyle or Power has its correlate in the
perceiving matter of Cavendish, quite different in many respects, but sharing an attention to
the complexity of surface, its non-obvious, non-quotidian nature. Prompting something
akin to vertigo, the surface imagined up close become monstrous, in the shifting scale by
which the atomic and human-sized became conflated. Imaginative shrinkage produced for
early modern writers a perceptual disequilibrium. The early modern microscopist was
something of a Gulliver, startled in Brobdingnag to discover at close quarters things
terrifying to his sensibilities, whether outsized bees, or the Maids of Honour who use him a
sexual toy, whose nakedness and magnified smells so horrify him. Up close, the natural
philosopher fumbled through the blasted landscape of magnified textures, in a state both of
shock and awe. Early modern surfaces were anything but straightforward. They might
produce involutions such that outer and inner became perplexingly similar, like a Mbius
strip whose surface has only one side, and they might, in CavendishÕs case have their own
perceptual powers. But surfaces presented to the seventeenth century a new kind of
ignorance, in which the plain and the ordinary demanded a poetics of the strange.
University of York
NOTES
[1] I quote R.E. LathamÕs engaging translation, On the Nature of the Universe (Penguin,
1951), while citing the Latin from the Loeb of W.H. Rouse, rev. Martin Smith, On the Nature
of Things (Harvard, 1992), ÔÉ Omnia cum rerum primordia sint in motu, summa tamen
summa videatur stare quiete É (2.309-10); Ônam saepe in colli tondentes pabula laeta /
lanigerae reptant pecudes quo quamque vocantes / invitant herbae gemmantes rore recenti,
/et satiati agni ludunt blandeque coruscantÕ (2.317-20) Ôpraeterea magnae legiones cum loca
cursu / camporus complent, belli simulacra cientes É et tamen est quidam locus altis
montibus unde / stare videntur et in campis consistere fulgor.Õ (2.323-32).[back to text]
[2] c.f. p. 69, Ôthat Nature is a perpetually self-moving body, dividing, composing, changing,
forming and transforming her parts by self-corporeal figurative motionsÕ.[back to text]
[3] See Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, p. 191, ÔFor there is such a
commixture of animate and inanimate matter, that no particle in Nature can be conceived
or imagined, which is not composed of animate matter as well as of inanimate.Õ[back to
text]
[4] A parallel passage in CavendishÕs Philosophical Letters (1664), pp. 444-5, develops the
example with a bowl instead of a ball (ÔWhen I throw a bowl, or strike a ball with my handÕ),
either a dramatic kitchen moment, or an early modern Frisbee. The argument in both cases
is premised on what Cavendish views as the incoherence of concussive, mechanical, theory,
based on the transfer of motion without a loss of matter, which fails to account for
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diminishment in material substance, see OÕNeill, intro, pp. xxix-xxxiii.[back to text]
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